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In his lengthy Mémoires d’outre- tombe, Chateaubriand described return-
ing to Paris in the 1820s and reflecting on the personal significance of 
each building and street he encountered in the French capital: a house 
where he and his sister had spent their childhood; the Palace of Justice 
that recalled his trial; the prefecture of police where he had served a brief 
prison sentence. To walk the streets of the city was to revisit an intimate 
past and history marked by familiar architectural sites and monuments, 
each detail evoking a memory redolent of “the skein” of former days.
In certain ways, this books possesses a similar quality. It was written 
over numerous years and in various places along the way. Sections and 
chapters evoke specific times, people, and cities that are called to mind 
in the act of rereading. In completing this work, I feel obliged to express 
my sincere gratitude to those who made it possible.
The first draft of this work was written at the University of Virginia 
under the guidance of Lenard Berlanstein, who unfortunately passed 
away before its publication. Without his help and insightful commentary, 
this book would not have been completed.
I would also like to thank Sophia Rosenfeld at Yale University who 
oversaw the initial writing of this work in Charlottesville. Her continued 
advice and support since I left Virginia has been deeply appreciated.
In addition, I am grateful to Benjamin Martin, whose early involve-
ment on this book while at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge 
has never been forgotten. Above all, he imparted to me the lesson that 
good historians must also be good writers.
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I am also grateful to John Powers and the History Department of 
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in Mainz. I can still recall evenings sitting at my desk and listening to 
the toll of the cathedral bells from the square as I worked on the pages 
of this manuscript. The ieg’s generous support during my nine- month 
stay in Germany provided a pleasant and stimulating atmosphere for the 
contemplation of the past while finishing this work. I would also like to 
express my thanks to Kevin Passmore and the History Department at 
Cardiff University where this book was completed. The department’s 
deep sense of collegiality has been much appreciated since my arrival 
in the United Kingdom.
The extended time I spent in France while conducting research 
for this book was invaluable and it would not have been possible without 
the support offered to me by the École Normale Supérieure in Paris 
and the University of Virginia.
I would also like to thank my family for their persistent support over 
the course of my education and career. Writing this book would certainly 
not have been possible without them.
Lastly, I would like to thank Lara for all her support and assistance. 
Her discerning comments and attention to detail have played an essential 
part in the completion of this book. Moreover, her fascination with the 
past and nostalgia for days that are not our own remain, as always, a 
continuous source of inspiration.
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The Cult of the Modern in the Nineteenth Century
Residing in the French capital briefly during the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the German writer Friedrich von Schlegel found Paris obsessed 
with what he described as “the fantastic caprice of ever- varying fashion.” 
More than simply a critique on the lifestyles and tastes of Parisian soci-
ety under Napoleon I, Schlegel’s remark was a judgment on the French 
Revolution itself. The social and political transformations wrought by 
France’s revolutionary experience in the late eighteenth century had, he 
believed, brought about a corresponding change in the sentiments and 
perspective of the country, commencing a period in which interests, 
just as much as politics, were subject to “the hasty revolutions of the 
fleeting day.”1 In Schlegel’s estimation, the French suffered from an acute 
cultural amnesia as contemporary and momentary trends now took 
precedence over the historical and permanent, and this denouement 
was, he contended, a direct result of the political turmoil and upset that 
had radically transformed conventional understandings of time and 
society in the wake of the Revolution.
Although Schlegel’s insights may have possessed a detached and ana-
lytical quality common to a foreigner’s encounter with a society different 
from his own, such interpretations were certainly not lost on French 
observers. Over a half century after Schlegel’s Parisian sojourn, the critic 
and philosopher Hippolyte Taine readily agreed with the observations 
made by the German intellectual. The French public interminably clam-
ored for the “new, salient, and unexpected,” he complained, while treating 
the past with disregard and boredom.2 What was true of fashion was 
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equally true of politics, in Taine’s opinion. “We demolished the past,” he 
claimed while speculating on the effect of the French Revolution, “and all 
had to be done over again.”3 Severed from their roots, the French could 
only appreciate the transitory and contingent, seeing behind them a past 
of ruin and destruction with little consequence for the here and now. 
“In France, we are neither reformers nor réformés,” the Saint- Simonian 
mystic Prosper Enfantin conceded in 1840. “We love new habits and 
have no desire for patching up old holes.” 4
Desire for novelty (nouveauté) encouraged a certain distaste for the 
old and passé, and this sentiment was as true of fashion as it was of 
physical places. Building projects during the middle of the century in 
French cities proceeded with little concern for the historic and familiar. 
Feeling nostalgic on a clement afternoon in the autumn of 1864, the 
journalist Victor Fournel decided to walk across Paris and revisit a small 
house that he had frequented on occasion in the past. “I wanted only 
to stroll by on the pavement slowly,” he claimed, “raise my eyes to the 
third floor and look at the place.” Arriving at the location, the journalist 
was appalled to find that where the building had once stood was now a 
vacant lot covered with a fresh layer of smoldering tar. “Even the street 
had disappeared,” Fournel remarked in near disbelief as he surveyed the 
area.5 The experience of the writer and renowned gastronome Charles 
Monselet was hardly different. The Paris that he had come to know 
and love was quickly vanishing in the midst of state efforts to beautify 
and modernize the city: “day by day, the streets are disappearing, the 
buildings known for their history [ancienneté] and the memories associ-
ated with them are being demolished.” 6 The modern was, in Monselet’s 
conjecture, a beast devouring history and memory that would, in time, 
efface all that had come before it.
Detached from the past, life, opinions, and perspectives in France 
became preoccupied with the “ephemeral, fugitive, [and] contingent”— 
elements that the critic Charles Baudelaire intimately associated with 
the advent of la modernité.7 Homilies to the modern and professions of 
faith in the “modern spirit” resonated among an entire generation and 
found expression in a variety of cultural, social, and political projects. 
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By midcentury, French outlooks revealed an infatuation with a cult of 
the modern, a trend first announced in the frenzied days of the French 
Revolution when politicians set out to break irrevocably with the past 
and create a radically new type of society with no historical precedent. 
In his Dictionnaire de la langue française published in the 1870s, the 
positivist philosopher and lexicographer Émile Littré listed the word 
modernité as a neologism dating from the late 1860s first coined by the 
literary critic Théophile Gautier.8 In actuality, Gautier had employed the 
term at various times over the previous decade in his reviews, applauding 
works that were “of [their] time” and, by consequence, pregnant with 
elements of “modernité.”9 Yet Littré was, nonetheless, correct in accent-
ing the word’s neologic quality, identifying it as a distinct product of a 
culture and period captivated by all things new and modern. “Modernity 
immediately seduces us with its intrinsic charms deriving from a secret 
conformity with our tastes,” admitted the literary critic René Doumic at 
the turn of the twentieth century.10 For Doumic, a writer who came of 
age in an intellectual milieu where modernity not only symbolized an 
idea but a complete way of life and thinking, the appeal of la modernité 
was a given.
The extraordinary change and potential that nineteenth- century intel-
lectuals and critics saw in their age have possessed an enduring legacy, one 
broadly understood as Western modernity. This phenomenon announced 
a “distinct and discontinuous” era in human history, a way of living and 
organizing society that was radically different from its antecedents.11 
It encapsulated the idea of a world torn asunder from its roots, “cut off 
from the past and continually hurtling forward at such a dizzy pace,” 
as the poet Octavio Paz once remarked.12 More than a century after 
men like Schlegel and Littré surmised on the meaning and import of 
modernity’s implications for their own time, theorists and historians 
continued to adhere to basic assumptions that the changes experienced 
by Western societies between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries 
marked a fundamentally unique mode of thought and existence unlike 
any other. This modernizing drive provided the template for a vision 
of global order rooted in capitalist models of exchange, industrialized 
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production, distinct cultural practices and forms of sociability that 
acquired a powerful “singularity” across time and space.13 To invoke 
the modern was to invoke universal certainty, a monolith shaped by a 
particular idea of society read in terms of its dynamic and innovative 
possibilities.
Yet what we have considered modern is the product of a specific 
cultural logic that has prized and valorized this exact quality. It was nomi-
nally “modern” societies that first articulated the very concept, seeing in 
it a reflection of their own power, prestige, and eminence.14 Rather than 
a condition, modernity has constituted a particular way of describing 
and talking about the world that is, in its very nature, self- referential. 
As John Camaroff has pointedly argued, “in itself, ‘modernity’ has no a 
priori telos or content.” It is not an analytical category, but an ideologi-
cal formation constructed and reproduced to revere certain practices 
and values while denigrating others.15 Once modernity is stripped of 
its essentializing qualities, all that remains are the varying discourses, 
ideological forms, and cultural representations that give substance to 
this construction. The presupposed modern monolith vanishes, “melt-
ing into air,” as Marx would have it. Until relatively recently, modernity 
was tied to an idiom of newness prized by cultural and social elites in 
the Western world.16 In this respect, it has underwritten and sustained 
a particular type of discursive power capable of representing socially 
particular behavioral norms and values in universal and humanitarian 
contexts while furnishing a rationale for their forcible imposition on 
others.
This book is concerned with the creation and possession of modern 
time as it has been known to the West. It takes for its subject France, a 
society that has stood at the forefront of the mythmaking and imagining 
that gave birth to a putatively “modern” vision of the self and the world 
at large. The French Revolution witnessed the first truly modernizing 
agenda in world history as its authors attempted to establish and dissemi-
nate a radical program of reform committed to overthrowing all existing 
values.17 Time was “turning a new page of history,” as the republican 
Charles- Gilbert Romme confidently informed his contemporaries before 
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the National Convention in 1793.18 The revolutionary experience gave 
birth to a cultural discourse that would evolve over the coming years as 
movements and ideas increasingly validated themselves through claims 
to a modern inheritance. Democratic protests, colonial projects, and 
even aesthetic modernisme all bore marks of the modernist mentality 
that grew up over the following century. If France continues to symbolize 
an avatar of the modern, this verdict is largely the product of the ways 
in which the French have conceptualized themselves and their society.
The cult of the modern, therefore, proposes an analysis of nineteenth- 
century French politics and culture that attempts to take modernity on its 
own terms. Nineteenth- century France has traditionally epitomized the 
epicenter of the modern, whether in light of the nation’s revolutionary 
inheritance or the various social and cultural developments that grew 
out of the period. It was the age of political and industrial revolutions, 
of large- scale urbanization programs, and the modernism of luminaries 
such as Baudelaire and Manet. Taken together, these details have con-
tributed to a history of modernity that has ranged from assessments of 
artistic production and new modes of cultural experience to the roots 
of a “social modernity” associated with distinct forms of knowledge 
and administration appropriate to the rational organization of society.19 
Typically, the question of modernity has been one of origins. Numer-
ous studies on nineteenth- century France have concerned themselves 
with pinning down the moment when modernity occurred or tracing 
its specific contours. Relatively less consideration has been given to 
questions of why the idea of modernity became so alluring to a widen-
ing French elite during this time or how this concept was iterated and 
reiterated within particular ideological frameworks and discourses.20 
Rather than seeking a genealogy of modernity, therefore, what is needed 
is a more informed understanding of the ways in which this concept 
has historically been imagined, reified, and deployed.
This analysis is especially instructive within the context of French 
politics and political life. From the French Revolution onward, the narra-
tive of modern France has predominantly been communicated through 
a strong republican tradition linked to the country’s revolutionary and 
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republican nationhood. The battles between republic and monarchy 
that colored the postrevolutionary period have conventionally signi-
fied a “matrix” of the modern, a liminal period marked by incremental 
social, political, and economic transformations that came to realization 
during the early years of the Third Republic founded in 1870.21 This 
notion of a postrevolutionary crossroads has underpinned a historical 
narrative equating the advent of the liberal and democratic republic 
with the definitive fulfillment of the nation’s revolutionary and modern 
inheritance. Needless to say, this tradition of French history writing was 
shaped and influenced largely by successive generations of republican 
intellectuals who were ideologically inclined to see the republican state 
as the fulfillment of the modern telos. The fact that “modern” France 
continues to imply a republican France reveals more about the place and 
importance of modernity in French political culture and ideology than it 
does about the actual policies and practices that forged the French nation.
In light of this appraisal, a more nuanced understanding of modernity’s 
performative function is required. During the nineteenth century, the sub-
ject of modernity was a leitmotif of French politics. Speaking in the name 
of the modern constituted a form of political action that was capable of 
legitimating a wide array of policies and platforms across ideological 
lines. The increasing importance French politicians and intellectuals 
placed on this concept corresponded to advances in democratization and 
imperial expansion, both of which exerted a crucial influence on politi-
cal discourse and administrative practices in the country. Confronting 
the various challenges posed by popular suffrage and colonial integra-
tion necessitated organizing and structuring new forms of control and 
legitimacy accommodating a democratic and imperial society. In the 
cultural and political vocabulary of nineteenth- century elites, modernity 
became the dominant idiom for this process, furnishing the means for 
imagining and discursively representing a world that, although described 
in exceedingly universal and utilitarian terms, remained, nonetheless, 
consistent with elite values and aspirations.
While radicals during the French Revolution articulated their revo-
lutionary program through a similar language, concepts like “modern 
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society” and “modern civilization” acquired new contextual meanings 
and significance in the postrevolutionary period. Chronic domestic 
instability coupled with French expansion into North Africa after 1830 
invested modernizing discourses with a distinct urgency and purpose 
as elites sought to reorder a fractured society. In many ways, Louis 
Napoleon Bonaparte and his Bonapartist entourage that came to power 
in 1852 set the tenor for this new style of French politics. Bonapartism 
exhibited an impressive ability to conjure the modern through bold 
speeches and spectacles. It dramatically wed modernity to a platform 
of national renewal and rehabilitation that proved effective at sus-
taining authoritarian government in an age of mass democracy. At 
midcentury, the revived Napoleonic Empire translated an infatuation 
with the modern into a dynamic political discourse and symbolism 
that contenders on both the left and the right found hard to discount. 
In the ensuing years, republicans and other political opponents were 
ultimately compelled to tailor their own ideological perspectives to 
the modernizing creed announced by the Bonapartist state and adhere 
to the cult of the modern.
This premise draws on recent reappraisals of the decade of conser-
vative reaction following the revolutions that swept across Europe in 
1848. The 1850s saw a new constellation of political alignments which 
prompted authoritarian regimes to endorse modernizing administra-
tive and fiscal policies that inadvertently contributed to a resurgence 
of nationalist and democratic movements in the years ahead.22 French 
historians now agree that the Second Empire marked a pivotal moment 
in which the roots of modern French democracy and political culture 
emerged.23 However, changes in political practice were influenced and 
often shaped by political vocabularies and language that require further 
scrutiny. In examining how the politics of modernity influenced the 
period, this book deviates from earlier accounts concerned with the 
origins of social modernity in France. It suggests that rather than a 
determinant of social and political change, modernity was constitutive 
of the social relations and political projects that assumed shape over the 
course of the nineteenth century.
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If an appreciation of modernity’s imaginative properties holds the 
prospect of repositioning the Second Empire within the narrative of 
modern France, it also proposes a rewriting of this narrative across 
space as well. The Third Republic has enjoyed a status not only as the 
progenitor of the modern French polity but also as the chief architect 
of the modern French empire. The “civilizing mission” espoused by 
republican ideologues in the 1880s and the consequent acquisition of 
colonies across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia over the course of the 
following half century has constituted the necessary backdrop against 
which a mass colonial consciousness emerged in France. The result 
marked a significant transition from a nation that merely possessed 
colonies to a colonial republic that thought of and conceptualized itself 
in exceedingly imperial terms.24 The French civilizing mission, an ideo-
logical program aimed at replicating modern European society overseas, 
traditionally provided a measure of continuity between France’s own 
path to modernity and the subsequent modernization of non- Western 
societies. As a completed process in Europe, modern civilization was 
disseminated outward, reproducing the social and political forms of 
modernity throughout the colonial world, often in a violent fashion.25 
This narrative not only perpetuated one of the primary myths of the 
West’s own modern origins and identity; it also distorted the fact that 
the colonial domain acted as a laboratory for many of the social and 
political projects that would be exported back and applied to European 
states under the guise of modernizing reforms.26
Considerations of the parallel nature of empire and European nation 
building have broadened our understanding of these processes in relation 
to one another. It is now recognized that external colonization abet-
ted the production of domestic administrative techniques and types of 
knowledge within European societies.27 Popular culture as well possessed 
an imminently imperial dimension that served to bridge the conceptual 
distance between metropoles and their peripheries. Propaganda, adver-
tising, literature, and entertainment all contributed to the reproduction 
of imperial ideologies within the public and private lives of citizens.28 
The prevalence of empire in nineteenth- century culture and society 
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suggests that imperialism was more than just a question of political 
action and policymaking. It transmitted notions of national identity, 
structured basic understandings of spatial and social difference, and 
gave expression to European ideals regarding the capability for human 
perfection and the generative role of the state in achieving them.29 These 
inclinations were especially strong in France where a republican ideol-
ogy prizing national unity and universal values lent itself to a particular 
style of imperial rule and empire building. Bolstering a polity vested in 
assimilationist principles and national association, France constituted 
an imperial nation- state as opposed to merely an imperial nation.30
The period between 1830 and 1870 has received comparatively limited 
attention in the making of this imperial polity. The result has been an 
acute underappreciation of the influence that postrevolutionary regimes 
exercised on either imperial policymaking or the core tenets that would 
underpin French colonial rule over the next century.31 Throughout 
much of the nineteenth century, France was governed by liberal and 
authoritarian regimes that did not always conform to republican mod-
els of cultural and legal assimilation. These regimes, nonetheless, laid 
much of the foundation for future colonizing efforts, whether through 
creating intermediary administrative bodies that engaged different eth-
nic and religious groups or proposing strategies of cooperation with 
indigenous community leaders.32 Although this brand of French “cosmo-
politanism” deviated from republican precepts of universal rights and 
indivisible sovereignty, many of these structures continued to furnish 
a basis for colonial and domestic policies well into the twentieth cen-
tury.33 A closer examination of French nation- and empire building in 
the years prior to the Third Republic holds the prospect of expanding 
our understanding of France’s often contradictory imperial polity and 
the concepts of nationality and citizenship that it influenced.
Much work has been done on the French Atlantic in critiquing 
revolutionary constructs of citizenship, democracy, and human rights 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.34 Studies highlighting the 
particularities of the colonial Atlantic have revealed just how portable 
and flexible ideological principles and conceptions of national identity 
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could be when applied within imperial contexts. For most of the nine-
teenth century, however, the Atlantic empire built upon slave labor 
and colonial plantocracies stood juxtaposed against a new vision of 
empire inspired by the Mediterranean, and social critics and policy-
makers of the day did not fail to draw stark contrasts between the two. 
The proximity of the Mediterranean region to continental Europe lent 
itself to greater metropolitan oversight and intervention than the dis-
tal Atlantic colonies. For this reason, North Africa played a key role 
in reshaping the imperial formations and practices of earlier regimes, 
redefining ideas of national boundaries, identity, and governance in the 
process as postrevolutionary thinkers responded to changes wrought 
by revolution and industrialization at home. By the early nineteenth 
century, the Mediterranean was already functioning as a laboratory for 
the administrative and modernizing policies of the First Napoleonic 
Empire.35 France’s entrance into the Ottoman Maghreb in 1830 and the 
subsequent creation of an Algerian settler colony only reinforced these 
tendencies as France established a permanent presence in the region 
that nurtured strong social and emotional ties to Europe. After 1830, 
metropolitan politics were increasingly projected onto Algeria in quite 
dramatic ways, resulting in the intertwining of imperial and domestic 
politics that influenced ideas of political leadership, militarism, repub-
lican virtue, and citizenship.36
This evolving interaction between imperial and national political 
culture provided the basis for la France transméditerranéenne, an abstrac-
tion upon which French values of universal liberty and national identity 
would be repeatedly projected and reified for national audiences over 
the course of the century.37 Two years after the launching of the North 
African military expedition, imperial ideologues were already outlining an 
ambitious plan of conquest and national assimilation for the nascent 
Algerian colony. As Victor- Armand Hain, founding member of the 
Société Colonial de l’État d’Alger, wrote in 1832:
The time is not far off for us to believe that the [Barbary] Regency, 
governed by the same laws as the metropole, divided into departments 
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will form a France transméditerranéenne. . . . Such an outcome will 
be worthy of a great nation, and our children will feel pride when, 
taking their first lessons in geography, they will be quizzed by the 
professor on the borders of their birth country and respond, while 
tracing their finger across the map: “France is bordered on the north 
by the Channel and the Pas- de- Calais and on the south by the great 
Sahara Desert.”38
While Hain may hardly be considered a visionary or master architect 
of French colonial policy, his procolonial pamphleteering was indica-
tive of a particular national- imperial mindset informed by a new sense 
of national mission and community stimulated during the years of 
the French Revolution. Although histories of French colonialism have 
traditionally made categorical and qualitative distinctions between a 
First French Empire centered on the Atlantic and the rise of the Third 
Republic’s Afro- Asian Empire a century later, the interval between these 
two imperial polities suggests a more nuanced pattern of development 
than previously imagined.39
La France transméditerranéenne constituted a key ideological for-
mation in a vision of empire that matured over the postrevolutionary 
period, an interim that David Todd has aptly labeled a “French imperial 
meridian.” 40 The ambiguous status of Algeria vis- à- vis France prior to 
1870, its proximity to the European mainland and its sizable settler and 
Muslim populations made Algeria at once a unique colonial territory 
and a model colony of France’s revived empire. This contradiction was 
one of many framing the so- called Algerian question, which extended 
from questions of political integration and cultural assimilation to the 
limits of acceptance in the French nation itself. As a point of conver-
gence for both national and colonial discourses, Algeria offers valuable 
insights into questions regarding how nineteenth- century individuals 
reflexively understood concepts of nationality, modernity, and the rela-
tionship between the French metropole and its colonial periphery. At 
once fashioned in the image of France and serving as an object against 
which French identity was constructed and projected, Algeria reflected 
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the mythologies and tensions inherent within the idea of France itself 
to a greater extent than other French colonial domains.41
The years of the Second Empire marked an important moment in the 
making of this Franco- Algerian imaginary. Imperial efforts to consolidate 
authority and unite the country during the 1850s and 1860s paralleled 
attempts to establish French rule in North Africa. From the beginning, 
state modernization policies exhibited a trans- Mediterranean orienta-
tion that, in their most aggressive phase, translated into a Bonapartist 
civilizing mission straddling the Mediterranean. French “modernization” 
and North African “colonization” were, in this respect, interconnected 
processes, and this denouement permitted political and cultural elites to 
imagine the contours of a modern French nation and society in diverse 
and often expansive ways. Studies detailing the administrative arrange-
ments and fluctuations of Second Empire colonial policies tend to lose 
sight of these wider parameters that framed Bonapartist politics and 
policies. A more critical examination of the modernizing acts under-
taken by the imperial government provides a better understanding of the 
interwoven trajectories that guided Franco- Algerian social and political 
development at midcentury. Moreover, because colonialism offered an 
important channel for the articulation and realization of modernizing 
projects, Algeria figured prominently in the battles waged over moder-
nity that played out during the period. Algerian modernization was 
championed by the Bonapartists just as much as their rivals; it served 
to justify the claims of metropolitans and spur colonists into action. As 
powerful symbols of the modernity coveted by French elites, coloniza-
tion and the civilizing mission became fixtures of national political life. 
The politics of modernity helped establish and legitimate the framework 
for a trans- Mediterranean community that, by the end of the Second 
Empire, had acquired both republican and colonial features.
In focusing attention on these trans- Mediterranean currents, this 
book argues that during the years of the Second Empire modernity 
remained an imaginary construction that carried a variety of meanings 
and associations. The gradual pace of French economic growth matched 
with the persistence of traditional forms of labor and social relationships 
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throughout the first half of the nineteenth century entailed that French 
modernization proceeded along a different path than that of Great Britain 
and the United States. The absence of the industrial “takeoff ” famil-
iar to Anglo- American modernization narratives permitted different 
groups to interpret the nature and scope of French modernity through 
divergent ideological perspectives.42 Although Napoleon III promoted 
his modernizing program in an effort to unify a divided country, more 
often than not modernity proved a divisive subject. Radical and social-
ist opponents exploited the Second Empire’s authoritarian policies and 
close ties with the clergy to fashion a revolutionary program of action 
promising an alternative vision of society organized around scientific 
and secular principles. Bonapartist modernity similarly came under fire 
from liberals and republicans who criticized the government only to 
tout their own platform of political and educational reform as the true 
cause of a new and “modern” France. Algerian settlers likewise employed 
the language of modernity to buttress claims of national inclusion and 
their vision of a French Algeria. The opposition that grew up under the 
imperial regime revealed the extent to which Bonapartist political dis-
course reoriented national politics, transforming an obsession with the 
modern into a common ideological currency.
In the fissures and commonalities it engendered, modernity remained 
tied to large issues of inclusion, identity, and power, eliciting questions 
of who had the authority to speak in the name of the modern and what 
attributes affirmed one’s inclusion in a community with other nominally 
“modern” individuals. In its broadest sense, identity persuades people 
and groups that they are in some way identical, thereby establishing a 
conception of community and basis for collective action. This process is, 
by necessity, characterized by acts of confrontation and antagonism as 
subjects define and categorize themselves against putative outsiders.43 Yet 
it equally fosters a sense of collectivity vested in “a powerfully imagined 
and strongly felt commonality.” 44 Modernity contained— and continues 
to retain— these dual “grammars of identity” that simultaneously con-
structed social and cultural boundaries while effacing them through 
the promotion of a worldview and system of values deemed common 
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to all.45 It is this aspect of commonality that shaped an understand-
ing of modernity as a multilayered, decentered, and spatially extended 
community connecting individuals across multiple points and fron-
tiers.46 In the democratic ambience of the postrevolutionary period, this 
sense of connection operated within political, national, and imperial 
discourses, offering a framework for the articulation of solidarity and 
alterity consistent with egalitarian and universal values. It was also this 
common sense of connection around which visions of a French people 
and nation united across vast swaths of space by a shared time, culture, 
and singularity would crystallize.
Placing the period of the Second Empire in a truly imperial context and 
assessing how conceptions of the modern defined French politics and 
political culture augers a rethinking of the general narrative that has 
underpinned France’s path to modernity. As an early case study in the 
politics of modernity, the Second Empire stands as the backdrop against 
which the contours of modern France can be critiqued and accurately 
appraised. The confluence of colonial and metropolitan politics at mid-
century came to be expressed in a new vision of a republican nation, one 
construed through democratic principles but that nonetheless rationalized 
forms of elite power and ethnic hegemony. Modernity became, in this 
context, encoded with forms of social and ideological domination that 
would structure French society well into the next century and give rise to 
the practices and discursive representations essential to the mythmaking 
and valorization of the French republican state.
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